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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE DELINQUENT STATE: ILLINOIS AND COMPLIANCE WITH
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGMENTS

INTRODUCTION
At Pinckneyville Correctional Center, one of the State of Illinois’s many
prisons, a hardworking corrections officer attempts to subdue a schizophrenic
inmate by wrestling him to the ground.1 As he forces the prisoner to the
ground, the officer falls, striking his right elbow and right hand against the
prison’s concrete floor.2 As a result of this injury, the officer seeks medical
treatment with a hand and arm specialist who ultimately performs surgery to
alleviate the officer’s symptoms.3 After his condition improves, the officer
returns to work at the Pinckneyville prison.4 In order to recover expenses from
his injury, the officer proceeds with a workers’ compensation claim, where an
arbitrator orders his employer, the State of Illinois, to pay the medical bills
accrued as a result of his hand and elbow injuries.5 Although the officer still
suffers from some lingering symptoms in his wrist and elbow, he is pleased
with the result of his surgery, and the arbitrator’s order, which required the
State to pay the costs of his medical treatment.6
However, soon after receiving the arbitrator’s decision, the recovering
officer begins to receive collection notices regarding his previously accrued
medical bills.7 If his debt is not paid, the notices indicate, the officer’s credit
score will be affected.8 Confused and frustrated, the officer contacts his

1. This introduction is based on several workers’ compensation cases filed against the State
of Illinois by its employees, mostly corrections officers in State prisons. This particular injury is
based on the case of Wece v. Pinckneyville Correctional Center, No. 08 WC 43914 (Ill. Workers’
Comp. Comm’n 2009) (Dibble, Arb.), aff’d, 11 I.W.C.C. 0673 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n
2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Wece, No. 08 WC 43914.
7. McDonald v. Pinckneyville Corr. Ctr., No. 04 WC 13082 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n
2010) (order); Petitioner’s Statement of Exceptions and Supporting Brief at 2, Starkweather v.
Menard Corr. Ctr., No. 08 WC 030919 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2009).
8. See George Pawlaczyk & Beth Hundsdorfer, Menard Chief Among 60 Who’ve Gotten
State Money for Injuries, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT, Jan. 17, 2011, http://www.bnd.com/
2010/12/19/1522293/state-foots-bill-for-hurt-guards.html (quoting attorney Thomas C. Rich, “‘I
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attorney to ask why he has been receiving collection notices from the medical
providers who performed his surgery, since the workers’ compensation
judgment ordered his employer, the State, to pay for his medical bills. After
investigating the status of his client’s medical bills, the attorney discovers that,
in contravention of the order of the arbitrator, the State has not made any
payments to the officer’s medical providers.9 In order to protect the credit
score and financial status of his client, the attorney files a petition for penalties
under the Workers’ Compensation Act, which allows the injured employee and
his attorney to collect extra monetary compensation when an employer does
not pay the employee’s bills on time.10 When the prison guard and his attorney
inquire into why the State has not paid the employee’s bills, the State, through
its assistant attorney general, says that “the state cannot pay bills with money
that it does not have.”11
As many Illinois state employees have realized, for the past several years
the State has been experiencing financial duress stemming from statewide and
far-reaching budgetary problems.12 Although numerous other state-funded
programs have received noted publicity, one greatly affected area which has
only begun to receive public attention involves the impact this financial duress
has had on the State’s injured employees and the workers’ compensation
system. In many instances, the State’s lack of funds has resulted in late
payments to its employees’ medical providers, which, under the Act, triggers
the imposition of penalties should the delay be considered “unreasonable or
vexatious.”13 In fact, the State has sought to utilize its defense of financial
duress in order to avoid the payment of Section 16, 19(k), and 19(l) penalties
to its employees under the Workers’ Compensation Act.14 Furthermore, the
State has asserted that as a governmental body, it should be due leniency by the
Workers’ Compensation Commission due to its financial duress and remain
exempt from timely payment of its employees’ medical bills and penalties
under the Act.15
Additionally, the State, by way of statute, has already excepted itself from
other provisions regulating workers’ compensation benefits payable to its
employees. Section 2 of the Workers’ Compensation Act provides that an

have clients whose credit ratings have gone down the toilet,’ because the state is late or fails to
pay [for injured workers’ medical bills].”).
9. See id. (describing the “common state practice of not paying or delaying payment of
[injured workers’] medical bills”).
10. See infra Part I.D (explaining the standards for the imposition of various penalties under
the Workers’ Compensation Act).
11. Pawlaczyk & Hundsdorfer, supra note 8.
12. Bob Secter, Illinois Speeds Toward Financial Chaos, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 2010, § 1, at 4.
13. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/16 (2008); id. 305/19(k).
14. See infra Part III.B.1–2.
15. See infra Part III.B.1–2.
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employer in the state may elect to provide and pay compensation for accidental
injuries sustained by himself or any employee.16 Ordinarily, in order to qualify
for “self-insurance,” as this coverage is called, an employer must meet certain
requirements, including a demonstration of sufficient financial strength to meet
workers’ compensation obligations in a timely manner.17 However, in the
Illinois Administrative Code, it is noted that only private employers who are
attempting to qualify for self-insurance must seek approval from the
Commission in order to self-insure.18 In fact, the Illinois Administrative Code
notes specifically that “[a] private employer does not include . . . the State of
Illinois.”19 Furthermore, while private employers may have their self-insured
status revoked if payments of bills are not made in a timely manner, the State
is not subject to these rules, and no indication is given that the State’s selfinsured status can ever be revoked.20 As a result, the State essentially
functions as a self-insured employer whose status cannot be revoked even if
the State fails in its duty to provide compensation to its injured employees.
These present circumstances in Illinois workers’ compensation, combined
with the current financial strain placed on the State, have created an
undesirable set of conditions for the employees of the State. Many employees’
compensable medical bills remain unpaid by the State, their employer.21 As
indicated, some employees have also received telephone calls or collection
notices regarding these unpaid bills, and some have had their credit affected by
these outstanding bills.22 While these employees have petitioned for penalties
under the Act as a result of outstanding medical bills, the State has similarly
asserted it will not pay these penalties due to its lack of funding.23 As a selfinsured employer, the State has an obligation to pay for its employees’
workers’ compensation benefits.24 However, since the State’s self-insured
status cannot be revoked, and payments have not been forthcoming, the State’s
employees are left essentially remediless, even in spite of all the protections
provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act.25 The medical providers who
supply treatment to the State’s employees are also constrained by small and

16. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2 (2008).
17. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7100.70 (2010).
18. Id. § 7100.70(a)(1)(A).
19. Id.
20. See id. § 7100.70.
21. See, e.g., McDonald v. Pinckneyville Corr. Ctr., No. 04 WC 13082 (Ill. Workers’ Comp.
Comm’n 2010) (order).
22. See supra note 7.
23. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
24. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2 (2008).
25. See id. (stating that employers who elect to self-insure, such as the State, are bound to
pay for their employees injuries); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7100.70 (2010) (excluding the
State from the filing requirements of private self-insurers).
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mostly ineffective remedies. Under the Act, in the case of delinquent
payments made by employers, medical providers are only entitled to one
percent interest accruing per month on their bill.26
While not all employers within the State are subject to the laws of the
Workers’ Compensation Act, the State itself is compelled to comply with these
statutes.27 As a self-insured employer, the State is subject to its own laws,
which require timely payment of an employee’s compensable medical bills.28
If any other Act-bound employer does not comply with the Commission’s
specified payment schedule, it is compelled to pay penalties under the Act.29
Additionally, self-insured employers, with the exception of the State, are
required to pay penalties, even in spite of financial duress.30
In light of its own laws, as well as the financial constraints placed on its
employees due to delinquent payment of their medical bills, the State should be
forced to comply with the laws of the State and compelled to pay penalties
under the Workers’ Compensation Act should it fail to pay its employees’
compensable medical bills pursuant to the Act. Part I of this paper discusses
the background and nuances of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act,
including the provisions which govern the payment of medical bills and
penalties. Part II deals with the State as an employer and discusses the various
laws that the State is both excepted from and subject to. Finally, Part III
discusses the current financial constrains placed on the State, the resulting
failure of the State to pay its employees’ medical bills, and the ramifications of
the State’s financial circumstances on its own employees.
I. ILLINOIS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT: BACKGROUND
A.

Scope of the Workers’ Compensation Act

According to precedent set by the Illinois Supreme Court in Shell Oil
Company v. Industrial Commission, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act is
intended to provide financial protection for employees who sustain accidents
arising out of and in the course of employment.31 Essentially, this language
indicates a two-part test which an employee must meet in order to receive
compensation: the injury must “arise out of” and occur “in the course of
employment.”32 “[A]n injury arises out of one’s employment, if, at the time of

26. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8.2(d) (2008).
27. Id. 305/3.
28. Id. 305/8.2(d) (requiring payment to be made within 60 days).
29. Id. 305/16, 305/19(k), 305/19(l).
30. Id. 305/2 (stating that all employers who elect to comply with the Act are bound by the
Act to all of his or her employees).
31. Shell Oil Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 119 N.E.2d 224, 228 (Ill. 1954).
32. See id. at 226, 228.
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the occurrence, the employee was performing acts [the employee] was
instructed to perform by his employer, acts which he had a common law or
statutory duty to perform, or acts the employee might reasonably be expected
to perform incident to his assigned duties.”33 Similarly, “[t]he requirement that
the injury occur ‘in the course of’ employment is concerned with the ‘time,
place, and circumstances of the injury.’”34 In order to meet these requirements,
the employee claimant has the burden to show that the injury arose out of and
in the course of employment by a preponderance of credible evidence.35
B.

Application of the Workers’ Compensation Act to Employers

Another important aspect of the Workers’ Compensation Act includes a
determination of which employers are subject to its provisions. While most of
the employers who operate businesses within the state are governed by the
specifications of the Act, these employers fall into one of two categories: those
who are compelled to automatically subscribe to the Act and those who elect to
comply.36 The employers who are bound by statute to comply with the
Workers’ Compensation Act include “enterprises or businesses which are
declared to be extra hazardous”; in addition, it applies automatically to “the
State, county, city, town, township, incorporated village or school district,
body politic or municipal corporation.”37 The other group of employers who
subscribe to the Act do so voluntarily: “[a]n employer in [the] State . . . may
elect to provide and pay compensation . . . according to the provisions of [the
Workers’ Compensation] Act.”38 In addition, the Act is extraterritorial; any
workers hired in the State who perform jobs outside the state or leave the state
for their employers are covered by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act.39
C. Treatment of Compensable Claims Under the Workers’ Compensation Act
1.

Procedural Aspects of Workers’ Compensation Claims

All employers within the province of the Workers’ Compensation Act,
those who subscribe voluntarily and automatically, are required to report
employee accidents to the Workers’ Compensation Commission, the Illinois
organization responsible for the administration and adjudication of statewide

33. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 541 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Ill. 1989).
34. Paganelis v. Indus. Comm’n, 548 N.E.2d 1033, 1039 (Ill. 1989) (quoting Scheffler
Greenhouses, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n, 362 N.E.2d 325, 327 (Ill. 1977)).
35. See id. at 1041.
36. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2, 305/3 (2008).
37. Id. 305/3.
38. Id. 305/2.
39. Id. 305/1(b)(2).
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workers’ compensation claims.40 When an employer disputes liability for its
employee’s injury, the first step in a legal proceeding to secure compensation
involves a hearing conducted in front of an arbitrator, an expert on Illinois
workers’ compensation law who acts as a judge and makes initial legal and
factual findings of the case.41 After the arbitrator issues his or her decision
relating to the compensability of the employee’s claim, that judgment stands as
a final verdict unless the losing party appeals to the Workers’ Compensation
Commission within thirty days after the arbitrator’s decision is filed with the
Commission.42 If the arbitrator’s decision is appealed, the claim is reviewed
by the Workers’ Compensation Commission, a panel of commissioners who
specialize in workers’ compensation practice.43 Although the arbitrator has the
opportunity to view the employee/claimant and make a finding on his or her
credibility, the official finding of fact and legal determination of the claim is
made by the Commission, who reviews the transcript of proceedings recorded
at the employee’s arbitration hearing.44 Illinois courts have established that the
factual and legal findings of the Commission “will not be disturbed unless they
are against the manifest weight of the evidence.”45 As a result, once the
Commission has made a determination on any aspect of the compensability of
a claim, it is held to the “manifest weight of the evidence” standard of review
and becomes difficult to overturn on appeal.46
2.

Payment of Medical Bills by Employers

Once the Workers’ Compensation Commission, through the decision of
either an arbitrator or a panel of commissioners, has determined that an
employee’s injury “arose out of and in the course of” his or her employment,47
employees are entitled to receive several benefits.48 Among others benefits,
Section 305/8(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act specifies that the relevant
employer shall provide and pay for all necessary medical aid “which is

40. See Paul A. Krauter, Basic Aspects of the Workers’ Compensation Act, in ILLINOIS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PRACTICE § 1.4, at 1–9 (2009).
41. Cf. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7030 (2010) (describing the arbitration process including
the assignment of an arbitrator, the rules of evidence, and requests for hearing).
42. Id. § 7040.70 (describing the process for review of arbitration decisions).
43. Id. §§ 7040.10–7040.80 (describing the process for Commission review).
44. City of Chicago v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 871 N.E.2d 765, 779 (Ill. App. Ct.
2007).
45. Id. at 778.
46. See id.
47. Shell Oil Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 119 N.E.2d 224, 228 (Ill. 1954).
48. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8 (2008) (outlining the amount of compensation owed to
an injured employee). Employers are also required to make these payments to medical providers
on behalf of the injured employee if the relevant employer does not dispute legal responsibility
for the compensable bills. Id.
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reasonably required to cure or relieve from the effects of the accidental
injury.”49 The Act also specifies that the employer is responsible to make
payments for the employee’s “treatment, instruction and training necessary for
the physical, mental and vocational rehabilitation of the employee, including
all maintenance costs and expenses incidental thereto.”50
In addition to the specifications in the Act regarding which medical bills an
employer is responsible to pay, the Workers’ Compensation Act also sets forth
a medical “fee schedule,”51 which gives the Workers’ Compensation
Commission the authority to establish the amount payable by employers to
medical providers for services rendered to their injured employees.52 The
specifications of the Fee Schedule include “payment rates, instructions,
guidelines, and payment guides and policies regarding application of the
schedule.”53 Through the authority provided in the Act54 the Commission
adopted this fee schedule “to be used in setting the maximum allowable
payment for a medical procedure, treatment or service covered under the
Act.”55 While the amounts of payments required vary depending on the type
of treatment or services rendered, the default rule established by the
Commission specifies that medical providers shall be reimbursed at seventysix percent of actual charges.56

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. 305/8.2(a).
52. Id. 305/8.2(d).
53. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7110.90(a) (2010).
54. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8.2(a) (2008).
55. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7110.90(a) (2010).
56. Id. § 7110.90(e). In some instances, employees may choose to use their health insurance
to pay for necessary medical treatment resulting from work-related injuries instead of
immediately exercising their rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act. While the reasons
may vary as to why employees would choose to use their group health insurance instead of
proceeding through workers’ compensation, oftentimes the use of health insurance results in more
immediate treatment for the employee. For example, in many circumstances medical providers
are required to seek approval from an employee’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier before
certain treatments can be given to an employee, essentially prohibiting the employee from
receiving proper treatment and forcing him to live with pain while waiting for workers’
compensation insurance approval. As a result, should an employee choose to use his group health
insurance in order to receive treatment for a work-related injury, Section 8(j) of the Workers’
Compensation Act provides a remedy to these insurance providers. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
305/8(j)(1) (2008). If the medical services paid by the employee’s group health insurance are
considered to be the result of a compensable, work-related injury, the health insurance carrier is
entitled to a credit against the employer for the amount paid. Id. The rationale for this provision
revolves implicitly upon compensability of the injury and subsequent treatment. See id. Since an
employer is responsible for all of the medical bills stemming from its employees’ work-related
injuries, the employer, rather than group health insurance, should ultimately shoulder the burden
of these medical bills.
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The Act’s Medical Fee Schedule also specifies a default timeframe in
which employers are required to make payments for their employee’s
necessary care and treatment.57 Section (d) of the Fee Schedule provides that
“[w]hen a patient notifies a provider that the treatment, procedure, or service
being sought is for a work-related illness or injury and furnishes the provider
the name and address of the responsible employer, the provider shall bill the
employer directly.”58 Further the Act specifies the timeframe for payment:
“[a]ll payments to providers for treatment provided pursuant to this Act shall
be made within 60 days of receipt of the bills,” provided that all data necessary
to adjudicate the relevant bills is provided.59 If the employer is unable or
unwilling to pay the medical providers within the sixty-day window provided
for in the Fee Schedule, the bill (or a portion thereof) accrues interest at a rate
of one percent per month which is payable to the medical provider.60 The
interest rate payable to providers set forth in the Medical Fee Schedule is one
remedy available to medical providers should an employer fail to make timely
payments of an employee’s bills. However, oftentimes when these payments
are delinquent, employees, as well as medical providers, may also suffer
financially as a consequence.61 The Workers’ Compensation Act has
anticipated such issues and as a result provides for specific types of deterrent
penalties available for employees to collect against their employers in the face
of the employer’s delinquent payments to medical providers.62
D. Imposition of Penalties Under the Workers’ Compensation Act
1.

Overview

Since its implementation one hundred years ago, the Workers’
Compensation Act has also provided for the remedy of additional
compensation (hereinafter referred to as “penalties”) and the assessment of
attorneys’ fees to its employees in certain cases.63 When an employer has
engaged in an “unreasonable or vexatious delay” in failing to pay benefits to an
injured worker, the Act makes these penalties available to employees.64
Although the Act has always provided for the assessment of such penalties, the
Commission has begun to apply them more liberally, and recent amendments

57. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8.2(d) (2008).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. For a more thorough discussion of the financial consequences suffered by employees as
a result of delinquent payment of medical bills, see infra Part III.B.2.
62. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/16, 305/19(k), 305/19(l) (2008).
63. Krauter, supra note 40, § 1.18, at 1–32; George J. Picha, Procedure, Appeals, and
Special Remedies, in ILLINOIS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PRACTICE § 5.51, at 5–45 (2009).
64. 37 Eleanor L. Grossman et al., ILL. LAW & PRAC. Workers’ Compensation § 151 (2009).
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to the Act now allow for a greater assessment of these fees on employers,
including new bases for their imposition.65
Although not the primary focus of this discussion, one quasi-penalty is
available to medical providers as a remedy for employers’ delinquent
payments of employees’ medical bills resulting from work-related injuries.66
Specifically, the Workers’ Compensation Act provides that employers are
required to make payments to medical providers “within 60 days of receipt of
the bills as long as the claim contains substantially all the required data
elements necessary to adjudicate the bills.”67 When an employer fails to
comply with this payment schedule, the medical provider’s bills begin to
accrue interest at a rate of one percent per month payable to the medical
provider.68 While this provision does provide these health care professionals
with a small remedy, the actual impact of Section 8.2(d) is limited in that it
provides little deterrence to employers from engaging in this type of delay, and
usually does not adequately compensate medical providers for the payments
which have not been forthcoming from employers and are often delayed for
months at a time.
Although the Act’s Fee Schedule provides for the aforementioned remedy
to medical providers in the case of delayed payment regarding compensable
medical bills,69 the Act and supplemental case law both provide that additional
compensation in the form of penalties and attorneys’ fees are available to an
employee in cases when medical expenses and/or temporary total
compensation are not paid or when a delay in payment of such benefits
occurs.70 In order to discourage employers from delaying payment of medical
bills that have not been disputed or have been adjudicated compensable, the
Workers’ Compensation Act provides three remedies to the employee
claimant. These remedial provisions are set forth in Sections 16, 19(k), and

65. Krauter, supra note 40, § 1.18, at 1–31 to –32.
66. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8.2(d) (2008).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see supra Part I.C.2.
70. Picha, supra note 63, at § 5.51. Although medical providers who provide treatment to an
injured employee often bear the brunt of the financial loss when an employer fails to make
payments pursuant to the Act, the remedies available to employees under Sections 16, 19(k), and
19(l) are substantially greater than the 1% interest per month available to medical providers under
Section 8.2(d). See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8.2(d), 305/16, 305/19(k), 305/19(l) (2008). The
implicit rationale for the higher amount of penalties available to employees is due to standing
issues. Unlike employees, who file for penalties and benefits under the Workers’ Compensation
Act, medical providers who render services to Illinois employees have no standing to file suit
against such employers. As a result, higher penalty rates are available to employees due to the
fact that they are the only party available to collect them.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

310

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:301

19(l) of the Act and vary in terms of standards for imposition as well as the
amount of compensation provided by law.71
2.

Section 19(l) Penalty for Delay

Three types of penalties, which are imposed and applied under two distinct
standards, exist throughout the Workers’ Compensation Act.72 Sections 16 and
19(k) penalties, provided for under the Workers’ Compensation Act, are
discretionary and require the Commission to find that the employer engaged in
“unreasonable and vexatious delay” by refusing to pay temporary total benefits
and compensable medical bills.73 However, the other form of penalties
available to employees under the Act, those specified under Section 19(l), are
more readily obtainable and require a lesser standard than “unreasonable or
vexatious delay.”74
Section 19(l) of the Workers’ Compensation Act applies to injuries which
occur after February 1, 2006, and specifically provides that:
If the employee has made written demand for payment of benefits under
Section 8(a) or Section 8(b) [temporary total benefits or payment of medical
bills], the employer shall have 14 days after receipt of the demand to set forth
in writing the reason for the delay. In the case of demand for payment of
medical benefits under Section 8(a), the time for the employer to respond shall
not commence until the expiration of the allotted 60 days specified under
Section 8.2(d). In case the employer or his or her insurance carrier shall
without good and just cause fail, neglect, refuse, or unreasonably delay the
payment of benefits under Section 8(a) or Section 8(b), the Arbitrator or the
Commission shall allow to the employee additional compensation in the sum
of $30 per day for each day that the benefits under Section 8(a) or Section 8(b)
have been so withheld or refused, not to exceed $10,000. A delay in payment
of 14 days or more shall create a rebuttable presumption of unreasonable
75
delay.

It is important to note that an employer has only fourteen days to inform
the employee in writing for the reason of nonpayment after receiving a written
demand for payment of temporary total benefits under Section 8(b).76
However, in the case of medical benefits, the commencement of the fourteenday response is extended by Section 8.2(d) of the Act as all medical benefits

71. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/16, 305/19(k), 305/19(l) (2008).
72. See infra Part I.D.2–4 (discussing in basic terms the three types of penalties provided for
under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act).
73. See infra Part I.D.3–4.
74. Picha, supra note 63, § 5.52, at 5–46 (noting that “a higher standard is required for
assessing § 19(k) penalties and § 16 attorneys’ fees” than for the penalty available under Section
19(l)).
75. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(l) (2008).
76. Picha, supra note 63, § 5.52, at 5–47.
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payments must be made “within 60 days of receipt of the bills as long as the
claim contains substantially all the required data elements necessary to
adjudicate the bills.”77 Additionally, under Section 19(l), when an employer
delays payment by fourteen or more days as specified above, a rebuttable
presumption of unreasonable delay is created.78 The critical test to determine
when an employer does in fact have a “good and just cause” for disputing
liability is again one of reasonableness.79 However, “[a]n employer’s reliance
on its own physician as to appropriate treatment or the extent of the
employee’s inability to work does not establish, by itself, that its challenge to
liability for temporary total compensation was made in good faith.”80 In fact,
“penalties under §19(l) . . . generally will not be awarded when the employer
acts in reliance on a qualified medical opinion to dispute an employee’s
entitlement to such benefits or when there are conflicting medical opinions.”81
As a result of the rebuttable presumption which arises against the employer
should he or she fail to make payments of an employee’s benefits after a
written request has been submitted, Section 19(l) penalties are often the more
commonly imposed form of additional compensation and are more easily
obtained by decision of arbitrators and the Workers’ Compensation
Commission.82
3.

Section 19(k) Delay in Payment of an Award

The rules for imposition of Section 19(k) penalties also apply to the
assessment of attorneys’ fees and costs, in that both penalties may be awarded
for an “unreasonable or vexatious delay in the payment of medical
expenses.”83 This standard, as specified by the court in McMahan v. Industrial
Commission, illustrates that a “higher standard is required for section 19(k)
penalties and section 16 attorney fees than for additional compensation under
section 19(l).”84 Similarly, the standard for assessment of Section 19(k)
penalties has been articulated in numerous judicial decisions of the Workers’
Compensation Commission and are cited throughout the Workers’
Compensation Practice handbook.85 First, the Commission has determined that
the employer bears the initial burden in justifying a delay for payment of

77. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8.2(d) (2008).
78. Picha, supra note 63, § 5.52, at 5–47.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Picha, supra note 63, § 5.52, at 5–46 (noting the lower standard for Section 19(l)
penalties and the mandatory $30-per-day penalty when the payment is late and the employer
cannot show an adequate justification).
83. McMahan v. Indus. Comm’n, 702 N.E.2d 545, 551 (Ill. 1998).
84. McMahan, 702 N.E.2d at 553.
85. See Picha, supra note 63, § 5.58, at 5–51.
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benefits.86 However, “[a]ssessment of penalties (and attorneys’ fees) is not
proper if an employer’s nonpayment is based on a reasonable and good-faith
challenge to liability” for the benefits to its employee, and additionally, that the
critical test for this type of challenge involves the reasonableness of the
belief.87 In order to meet the reasonableness test, an employer’s belief must be
justified by facts “that a reasonable person in the employer’s position would
have.”88
As a result of the higher standards required to impose penalties under
Section 19(k) of the Act, the amounts awarded in these instances can be
substantial.
When unreasonable or vexatious delay of payment of
compensation has been determined to exist by the Workers’ Compensation
Commission, “then the Commission may award compensation additional to
that otherwise payable under this Act equal to 50% of the amount payable at
the time of such award.”89 Further, in determining when to impose penalties
under Section 19(k) for injuries occurring after February 1, 2006, the
Commission shall consider “whether an Arbitrator has determined that the
claim is not compensable”90 among other factors.91 In National Manufacturing
v. Industrial Commission, the court further specified that Section 19(k) of the
Workers’ Compensation Act “links the penalty to the amount payable at the
time of the award, not the amount vexatiously withheld from the claimant” 92
and “defined the [term] ‘amount payable’ as the entire amount of
compensation awarded, but not including any compensation for permanent
disability that had not accrued at the time of the penalty hearing.”93
As a result, the Act provides that the Workers’ Compensation Commission
“may award penalties for the unreasonable or vexatious delay of payment or
intentional underpayment of temporary total compensation on the whole
amount awarded, rather than just the unpaid portion.”94 However, the phrase
“may” indicates discretion on the part of the Commission to impose 19(k)
penalties and allows the Commission to base any penalties imposed on the
portion of the award that has accrued but has not been paid.95

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(k) (2008).
90. Id.
91. Id. “Among other factors” refers to the determination of whether the employer had made
payments under Section 8(j) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, which discusses benefits
received under a group health plan. See id. 305/8(j).
92. Nat’l Mfg. v. Indus. Comm’n, 780 N.E.2d 703, 705–06 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
93. Picha, supra note 63, § 5.56, at 5–50; see Nat’l Mfg., 780 N.E.2d at 705–06.
94. Picha, supra note 63, § 5.56, at 5–50 (emphasis added).
95. See, e.g., Anders v. Indus. Comm’n, 773 N.E.2d 746, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); Kendzora
v. Enter. Mfg., No. 08 IWCC 864 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2008) (opinion on review);
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Section 16 Attorneys’ Fees

In workers’ compensation claims, a standard maximum fee which an
attorney may collect for services rendered is specified under Section 16(a) of
the Act. Specifically, the Act provides that
With respect to any and all proceedings in connection with any initial or
original claim under this Act, no claim of any attorney for services rendered in
connection with the securing of compensation for an employee or his
dependents, whether secured by agreement, order, award or a judgment in any
court shall exceed 20% of the amount of compensation recovered and paid,
unless further fees shall be allowed to the attorney upon a hearing by the
96
Commission fixing fees, and subject to the other provisions of this Section.

In addition to listing the maximum amount recoverable by an attorney in a
workers’ compensation proceeding, Section 16 also acts as a form of penalty if
an employer should, in certain circumstances, fail to make payments of
temporary total disability benefits or compensable medical bills.97 More
specifically, whenever the Workers’ Compensation Commission determines
that an employer, his agents, or insurance carrier
has been guilty of delay or unfairness towards an employee in the adjustment,
settlement or payment of benefits due such employee . . . or has been guilty of
unreasonable or vexatious delay, intentional under-payment of compensation
benefits, or has engaged in frivolous defenses which do not present a real
controversy, within the purview of the provisions of paragraph (k) of Section
19 of this Act, the Commission may assess all or any part of the [employee’s]
98
attorney’s fees and costs against such employer or its insurance carrier.

Since Section 16 specifically refers to an employer’s conduct within the
purview of Section 19(k) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, attorneys’ fees
and Section 19(k) penalties for delay are often awarded together for
“unreasonable or vexatious delay.”99
II. THE STATE OF ILLINOIS AS AN EMPLOYER: INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS AND
EXCEPTIONS
A.

The State as an Employer

The formal title to the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act is set forth as
the opening provision of the document:

Clohessy v. Kid Snips, Inc., No. 07 IWCC 0403 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2007) (opinion on
review).
96. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/16a(B) (2008).
97. Id. 305/16a.
98. Id. 305/16.
99. Picha, supra note 63, § 5.59, at 5–52.
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An Act to promote the general welfare of the people of this State by providing
compensation for accidental injuries or death suffered in the course of
employment within this State, and without this State where the contract of
employment is made within this State; providing for the enforcement and
administering thereof, and a penalty for its violation, and repealing an Act
100
therein named.

As the title specifies, the Act was enacted in order “to promote the general
welfare” of the people of Illinois.101 In addition to the Act’s goals of
protecting state citizens and employees, the State has several other vested
interests in the Workers’ Compensation Act: the Illinois legislature also drafted
and implemented the law into action.102 As a governmental body, the process
of enacting and repealing laws is an essential State function. However, the
State also plays another, equally significant role within the process of workers’
compensation claims: employer.103 In fact, the very first provision specified
within the Workers’ Compensation Act defines an “employer” as: “[t]he State
and each county, city, town, township, incorporated village, school district,
body politic, or municipal corporation therein.”104 As a result, the Workers’
Compensation Act has clearly specified that the State, in addition to fulfilling
its role as the legislature, acts as an employer under the Act.
B.

Self-Insured Employers

One requirement which all employers subject to the provisions of the
Workers’ Compensation Act must comply with includes the acquisition of
workers’ compensation insurance.105 Section 4(a) states
[a]ny employer . . . who shall come within the provisions of Section 3 of this
Act [regulating self-insured employers], and any other employer who shall
elect to provide and pay the compensation provided for in this Act shall: . . .
[i]nsure his entire liability to pay such compensation in some insurance carrier
authorized, licensed, or permitted to do such insurance business in this State.
Every policy of an insurance carrier, insuring the payment of compensation
under this Act shall cover all the employees and the entire compensation
106
liability of the insured.

Employers who subscribe to the Act have one of two choices in regard to
insurance: the employer may choose to obtain third party insurance or an

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/1 (2008).
Id.
See id.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/1(a)(1) (2008).
Id.
Id. 305/4(a).
Id.
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employer may elect to “self-insure.”107 Those employers who choose to follow
the provisions set forth in the Act by election shall make such election by
“filing notice of such election with the Commission, or by insuring his liability
to pay compensation under this Act in some insurance carrier authorized,
licensed or permitted to do such insurance business in this State.”108
Conversely, some employers, including those who are compelled to comply
with the Workers’ Compensation Act, may choose to self-insure or hold
themselves responsible for any costs incurred by workers’ compensation
claims made by their employers in lieu of obtaining a third party insurer.109 If
an employer chooses to self-insure, it must “[f]ile with the Commission
annually an application for approval as a self-insurer which shall include a
current financial statement, and annually, thereafter, an application for renewal
of self-insurance, which shall include a current financial statement.”110
Private employers who choose to self-insure must also meet certain
requirements.111 In order to comply, a private employer must demonstrate
sufficient financial strength to meet workers’ compensation obligations in a
timely manner, and must provide security as required by the Commission.112
According to the Commission, if a self-insured employer is financially
unwilling or unable to pay its workers’ compensation obligations, a group
known as the Illinois Self-Insurers Advisory Board113 is empowered to and will

107. Id. 305/2(a).
108. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2(a) (2008).
109. See id. 305/4(a).
110. Id. 305/4(a)(1).
111. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7100.70 (2010).
112. Id.
113. The Self-Insurers Advisory Board is created through Section 4a-1 of the Workers’
Compensation Act. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/4a–1 (2008). According to the Act, the Advisory
Board is
for the purpose of providing for the continuation of workers’ compensation and
occupational disease benefits due and unpaid or interrupted due to the inability of an
insolvent self-insurer . . . to meet its compensation obligations when the employers’
financial resources, security deposit, guaranty agreements, surety agreements and excess
insurance are either inadequate or not immediately accessible for the payment of benefits,
and to review and recommend to the Chairman of the Commission the disposition of all
initial and renewal applications to self-insure filed by private self-insurers under this Act
and the Workers’ Occupational Disease Act.
Id. Additionally, Section 4a–3 of the Act provides for the selection of Advisory Board members
and specifies that “[t]he Board shall consist of the Chairman of the Illinois Workers’
Compensation Commission, as Chairman of the Board, and six other members appointed by the
Chairman who shall be expert in matters of self-insurance for workers’ compensation liability.
One such member shall represent the general public.” Id. 305/4a–3(a). A vacancy on the Board
“shall occur upon his resignation, death, or conviction of a felony,” and also specifies that the
Chairman may remove a Board Member from office upon a formal finding of “incompetence,
neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.” Id. 305/4a–3(b).
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assume the outstanding obligations of the insolvent insurer.114 The role of the
Advisory Board is to take all necessary steps to collect, recover, and enforce
the security posted by the self-insurer.115 Further, future administration of an
employer’s workers’ compensation claims will be determined by the nature of
the security posted by the employer.116 If the employer is a current self-insurer
who fails to provide sufficient security, such employer’s self-insurance
privileges can be terminated.117
C. State of Illinois’s Exemption from Self-Insured Requirements
Since the State is required to comply with the provisions of the Act,118 it
has also elected to self-insure under the Workers’ Compensation Act.119
However, since the State is not a private employer, it is not subject to the
requirements which other, private employers must meet in order to selfinsure.120 Pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Code, public entities,
including the State, appear to be excepted from seeking approval from the
Commission should they choose to self-insure.121 Conversely, the Code
provides that all private employers must submit an annual report to the
Commission seeking approval each year.122
III. ILLINOIS’S FINANCIAL DURESS AND REPERCUSSIONS
A.

Illinois’s Financial Crisis

In addition to the problems faced by the national economy, the State has
also recently suffered from severe financial hardships.123 The Illinois state
budget has been considered one of the worst in the nation, and problems are
estimated to grow worse before they begin to resolve.124 Illinois, it has been

114. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/4a–6(a) (2008).
115. Id.
116. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7100.70(c)(3) (2010).
117. Id. § 7100.70(e)(2).
118. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/3 (2008).
119. Id. 305/4(a)(1).
120. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7100.70(a)(1)(A) (2010).
121. Id. (excluding the State and other public entities from the definition of “private
employer”).
122. Id. § 7100.70(a)(2)(A).
123. See Deanna Bellandi, Illinois Mired in Financial Crisis, ST. JOURNAL-REGISTER (Sept.
18, 2010, 10:17 AM), http://www.sj-r.com/breaking/x191996969/Illinois-mired-in-financialcrisis (describing the State’s $13 billion deficit and backlog of unpaid bills); Mike Riopell,
Illinois on Financial ‘Top 10’ Worst List, PANTOGRAPH, Nov. 12, 2009, at A3 (noting that
financially, Illinois is among the “worst-off” states in the country); Terry Savage, ‘Our State Is
$120 Billion Short!’, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 23, 2010, at 26 (“Illinois is bankrupt.”); Secter, supra
note 12 (describing the State’s budget deficit).
124. Riopell, supra note 123.
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speculated, “has a long history of spending more than it takes in.”125 Bob
Secter, a reporter for the Chicago Tribune, writes, “[the] Illinois government is
staring down the barrel of an explosive financial mess, and perhaps nothing
frames the danger better than two big numbers.”126 Secter estimates the first
number to be $26 billion, “the grand total that lawmakers have allotted this
year for the meat of what the state does: funding education, health care, child
welfare, public safety and the machinery of the government itself.”127
Numerous sources place the current budgetary deficit at approximately $13
billion, including “$8 billion in unpaid bills to social service agencies,
pharmacies and others.”128
The financial strains placed on the State government have left many to
question exactly how and which outstanding bills will be paid. Illinois
Governor Pat Quinn has promised “[e]very bill will be paid by the end of this
year.”129 However, Quinn was actually referring to bills submitted before the
end of the fiscal year in 2010, which ended on June 30, 2010.130 While the
State is taking responsibility for these bills, new debts are accruing.131
Conversely, Governor Quinn has yet to make any promises regarding the
payment of bills submitted after June 30, 2010.132 The repercussions of these
bill payment strategies could mean “there’s no guarantee that a vendor who did
work for the state in August, after the new fiscal year started, will see payment
anytime before next year.”133 Some State vendors have even been waiting as
long as seven months to receive their payments.134 In fact, Illinois’s chief
“bill-payer,” Comptroller Dan Hynes, has stated that the State owes upwards of
$5 billion to statewide schools, universities, child-care centers and rehab
centers.135 Hynes calls this phenomenon “obscene,”136 telling the New York
Times: “[t]his is not some esoteric budget issue; we are not paying bills for
absolutely essential services.”137 As a result, the State has been unable to pay
the vast majority of its bills, and owes billions to numerous statewide

125. Id. (quoting Susan Urahn, Managing Director of the Pew Center for the States).
126. Secter, supra note 12.
127. Id.
128. Monica Davey, Questions Persisting as Illinois Raises Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2011,
at A16; see Secter, supra note 12.
129. Bellandi, supra note 123.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Bellandi, supra note 123.
135. Savage, supra note 123.
136. Id.
137. Michael Powell, Illinois Stops Paying Its Bills, But Can’t Stop Digging Hole, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A1.
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institutions.138 In addition to the schools, universities, child-care centers and
rehab centers who are owed money from the State,139 the State has been
shirking its duties as an employer by failing to pay its employees’ medical bills
and even penalties which have been imposed by the Workers’ Compensation
Commission.140
B.

State of Illinois’s Payment of Workers’ Compensation Medical Bills and
Penalties
1.

Background

As a result of the State’s recent financial problems, many areas of fiscal
responsibility have been neglected and many of the State’s bills have remained
unpaid for a period of up to seven months, while more debt continues to
accrue.141 While some organizations have received more publicity in terms of
its unpaid bills, for example schools and child-care centers,142 other aspects of
the State’s budget, such as payment of its employees’ workers’ compensation
benefits, have been just as severely affected, but have only just begun to
receive any media attention.143 However, due to the State’s financial
constraints, the State as an employer has been making delinquent payments on
the medical bills accrued by its employees for work-related injuries.144
As previously discussed, when liability for an employee’s claim is not
disputed by an employer or the claim has been adjudicated compensable by the
Workers’ Compensation Commission,145 an employer is required to reimburse
medical providers for treatments given to its employee to “cure or relieve from
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the State’s delinquent payment of its employees’
workers’ compensation medical bills). Additionally, in response to the State’s “fiscal
emergency,” the Illinois legislature passed a bill in January 2011 that raises individual income tax
rates by approximately sixty-six percent. Davey, supra note 128. Although the decision to
increase taxes has been praised by Pat Quinn, the governor of Illinois, many wonder whether this
tax package will be “enough to solve the state’s crisis.” Id.
141. Bellandi, supra note 123.
142. Savage, supra note 123.
143. See Pawlaczyk & Hundsdorfer, supra note 8.
144. See the following cases, which describe the delinquent payments made by the State:
Dowdy v. Vienna Corr. Ctr., No. 08 WC 05672 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010) (order);
Mabrey v. Ill. Dept. of Corrs., No. 07 WC 09331 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010) (order);
McDonald v. Pinckneyville Corr. Ctr., No. 04 WC 13082 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010)
(order); Studt v. Menard Corr. Ctr., No. 08 WC 55780 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010)
(order); Kinder v. Choate Mental Health Ctr., No. 08 WC 48796 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n
2010) (Dibble, Arb.), aff’d No. 10 I.W.C.C. 0828 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010); Wece v.
Pinckneyville Corr. Ctr., No. 08 WC 43914 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2009) (Dibble, Arb.),
aff’d, 11 I.W.C.C. 0670 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2011).
145. See supra Part I.C.2.
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the effects” of a work-related injury.146 Additionally, if such payments are not
made pursuant to the time-frame given in the Medical Fee Schedule of the
Workers’ Compensation Act, an employee may make a petition for penalties
under several provisions of the Act.147 As a result of the State’s financial
difficulties, the State as an employer has been failing to pay medical providers
for services provided to its employees for work-related injuries.148 The State’s
employees, as a result of these late payments, have asserted their rights under
the Workers’ Compensation Act to file petitions for penalties.149 However,
rather than pay the penalties incurred by late payment to medical providers, the
State has asserted it should be due leniency and has unilaterally exempted itself
from payment of the penalties based on the argument that the State is currently
a governmental body under financial duress.150
2.

Rationale for Filing of Penalties

As previously discussed, penalties may be imposed against an employer in
various circumstances, but typically an employer must fail to make payments
to medical providers for an injured employee’s accrued medical bills.151
However, in order to receive any type of additional compensation in the form
of penalties, the injured employee must make a motion to the Workers’
Compensation Commission asking for relief in the form of monetary penalties
against his or her employer.152 When an employee files a motion for penalties
against his or her employer, the desired result is generally not only to secure
additional compensation, but to discourage the employer from engaging in
delinquent payments and to protect the financial interests of the medical
providers and employees.153
While the failure of an employer (such as the State) to pay an employee’s
compensable medical bills seemingly impacts medical providers most directly,
it can also severely affect employees. For example, when a doctor’s office or
hospital does not receive reimbursement from an employer, the medical
provider will often seek compensation from another source—the injured
worker directly, despite the fact that the employer is bound through the
Workers’ Compensation Act to pay such expenses.154 As a result of the State’s
recent lack of financial resources, many State employees have received
146. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8(a) (2008).
147. See id. 305/16, 305/19(k), 305/19(l).
148. See infra Part III.B.4.
149. See infra Part III.B.4.
150. See infra Part III.B.4.
151. See supra Part I.D.1.
152. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/16, 305/19(k), 305/19(l) (2008).
153. As has been discussed, the penalty provisions of the Act allow for additional payments
not only to the employee, but also to the provider of medical services. See id.
154. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8(a) (2008).
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collection notices regarding their unpaid medical bills accrued from their
work-related accident.155 The results of these delinquent payments can not
only include collection notices, but can also drastically affect an employee’s
credit score.156
In addition to receipt of collection notices and an affected credit score,
some State employees have been denied necessary medical treatment or
medication due to the State’s failure to pay bills in a timely manner. In the
case of Maue v. State of Illinois Menard Correctional Center, an injured prison
guard attempted to see a local physician to treat him for his injuries, but was
denied treatment due to the State’s “failure to timely authorize and pay for
medical treatment.”157 Similarly, in a letter addressed to attorney Mr. Rich,
who represents numerous injured workers, the Injured Workers Pharmacy, a
group which provides medication to injured workers,158 stated the following:
As you are aware, Injured Workers Pharmacy (IWP) has been providing your
client(s) with their workers’ compensation prescription medication for some
time now. You may also have heard that the State of Illinois is facing serious
financial hardship which has unfortunately impacted our ability to continue to
service your state-employed clients.
IWP has been providing medication to the majority of state-employed injured
workers for up to a year with minimal reimbursement from the State of Illinois.
Claims typically take close to one year before any payment is received, and
when/if payment does take place it is at a greatly reduced rate. Therefore, it is
with much regret that we must inform you that IWP will no longer be able to
provide these clients with medication moving forward. . . .
This is an unfortunate consequence of the financial condition of the State of
159
Illinois.

As a result, the financial duress of the State has not only affected the
ability of medical providers to collect payments on overdue bills, but also
caused State employees to suffer numerous hardships including the receipt of

155. McDonald v. Pickneyville Corr. Ctr., No. 04 WC 13082 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n
2010) (order); Petitioner’s Statement of Exceptions and Supporting Brief at 2, Starkweather v.
Menard Corr. Ctr., No. 08 WC 30919 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2009), aff’d, 11 I.W.C.C.
0670 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2011).
156. See Pawlaczyk & Hundsdorfer, supra note 8 (quoting attorney Thomas C. Rich, “‘I have
clients whose ratings have gone down the toilet,’ because the state is late or fails to pay”).
157. Petitioner’s Statement of Exceptions and Supporting Brief at 2, Maue v. Menard Corr.
Ctr., No. 08 WC 43915 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2009), aff’d No. 11 I.W.C.C. 0672 (Ill.
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2011).
158. See IWP: THE PATIENT ADVOCATE PHARMACY, http://www.iwpharmacy.com/De
fault.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2011).
159. Letter from Injured Workers Pharmacy to Law Office of Thomas Rich (Dec. 6, 2010)
(on file with author).
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collection notices,160 a negative impact on credit scores,161 and in some cases,
even a denial of necessary medical treatment or medication.162 In cases where
injured employees of the State suffer such consequences, the only remedy
available to them involves the imposition of penalties against the State, since,
as previously discussed, the State’s self-insured status as an employer cannot
be revoked should it be unable or unwilling to pay its employees’ bills.163
Therefore, especially in cases when an employee has suffered financially as a
result of the State’s delinquent payments on compensable medical bills,
penalties should be imposed and awarded to such employees not only to
discourage the State from engaging in practices of non-payment, but to provide
some financial relief to injured employees barely able to make ends meet.
3.

State’s Historical Payment of Penalties

Although the State’s financial duress has been a fairly recent issue within
the past two to three years, the question of whether the State is subject to the
provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act which require timely payment
of medical bills or the imposition of specific penalties has been historically
analyzed in numerous instances by the Illinois courts.164 For example, in
Martin v. Giordano, the Workers’ Compensation Commission awarded
penalties under Section 19(k) for “unreasonable and vexatious” behavior in
late payment of medical bills.165 After the Commission ordered payment of
these penalties, the State as defendant, however, refused payment based on the
argument that “the State [was] not subject to section 19(k)”166 as a result of
sovereign immunity.167 More specifically, the State contended that since
liability on the State was not “unequivocally set forth in section 19(k)” of the
Workers’ Compensation Act, State liability did not exist.168 On appeal, the
appellate court held not only that Section 19(k) of the Act did in fact apply to
the State, but also that since other employers may not “pick and choose what
‘compensation’ they will pay,” neither may the State.169 Furthermore, the
Martin court made a pivotal distinction in terms of the State’s obligations as an
employer: that since Section 19(k) of the Act never uses the term

160. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 156 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text.
163. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 50, § 7100.70 (2010).
164. See, e.g., Martin v. Giordano, 450 N.E.2d 933, 934 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Christopher v.
Ill. Dep’t of Corr., No. 07 IWCC 0257 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2007) (opinion on review).
165. Martin, 450 N.E.2d at 934.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 935.
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“penalties,”170 but simply provides for “additional compensation,” when there
is an intentional delay of payment, the State had a choice to either pay timely
benefits due and owing under the Act or pay additional compensation under
Section 19(k) of the Act.171
Similarly, in Christopher v. State of Illinois Department of Corrections,
the Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed the arbitrator’s award of
additional compensation under Section 19(k) against the State for failure to
timely pay medical bills.172 Although Christopher was resolved by the
Commission in 2007, the State had already begun to assert a lack of funds as
its defense for failing to pay its employees’ medical bills or Section 19(k)
penalties.173 The arbitrator noted that the employee’s unpaid medical bills
were admitted into evidence without objection and that the outstanding
balances remaining on the bills were approximately two to seven months
old.174 The State, in response, offered no indication as to when the bills would
be paid, but simply stated they would be paid as soon as funds were made
available and cited insufficiency of funds as the reason for its delinquent
payments.175 However, in determining that Section 19(k) was applicable to the
State in this instance, the arbitrator determined that the State’s defense of
insufficient funding did “not meet the burden of justifying the delay in medical
benefit payment.”176 After reviewing the affidavit provided by the State
regarding insufficiency of funds, the arbitrator held “[t]his defense would not
be available to a private employer and the Act does not except out the State of
Illinois for liability for failure to pay benefits timely.”177 Additionally,
[t]he State has intentionally chosen not to pay this obligation. Respondent has
unilaterally decided to place the burden of medical expense payment, and the
risks associated with non-payment, on its employees. . . . Self-insured’s, like
this Respondent, are in part granted their status by a promise to satisfy their
178
statutory obligations.

Furthermore, the arbitrator concluded the decision with a sweeping statement
indicating the importance of employer compliance with these provisions: “[t]he
failure to pay medical bills has a chilling effect on the Worker’s [sic]
Compensation Act and prevents [employees] from seeking needed

170. Martin, 450 N.E.2d at 935.
171. Id.
172. Christopher v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., No. 07 IWCC 0257 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n
2007) (opinion on review).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Christopher, No. 07 IWCC 0257.
178. Id.
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treatment.”179 Through this statement, the Workers’ Compensation arbitrator
and Commission underscored the importance of the State’s compliance with
payment of medical bills and resulting penalties if the bills are not timely
paid.180
4.

Recent Inconsistent Commission Rulings

Despite the fact that workers’ compensation arbitrators and the
Commission have historically awarded penalties against the State under the
Workers’ Compensation Act for failure to pay medical bills,181 numerous
recent decisions have been handed down from the Commission suggesting that
the law in this area may not be well-settled.182
For example, in the case of McDonald v. Pinckneyville Correctional
Center, the employee and his attorney petitioned for penalties against the State,
his employer, for delinquent payment of medical bills.183 In a determination
made by the Commission regarding the imposition of these penalties, the
Commission issued an order dated September 8, 2010, which affirmed the
award of medical compensation and penalties under Sections 16, 19(k) and
19(l) of the Act.184 Additionally, the Commission found that the employee and
his attorney had requested on four separate occasions that the State pay
specific outstanding medical bills to Washington University Physicians.185

179. Id.
180. For a more in-depth look at past Commission decisions underscoring the premise that the
State is subject to payment of penalties, see the following cases: Devine v. State, No. 08 IWCC
0131 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2008) (opinion on review) (affirming the arbitrator’s order to
the State to pay benefits under Section 19(k), 19(l) and Section 16 attorneys’ fees for failure to
timely pay benefits); Holbrook v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., No. 08 IWCC 1430 (Ill. Workers’ Comp.
Comm’n 2008) (opinion on review) (affirming arbitrator’s holding that a failure to tender any
evidence to substantiate the State’s refusal to pay benefits is unreasonable and vexatious in
nature); Giordano v. Chester Mental Health Ctr., No. 07 IWCC 0397 (Ill. Workers’ Comp.
Comm’n 2007) (opinion on review) (affirming arbitrator’s award of additional compensation
under Section 19(k) for State’s delay in payment of medical bills); Lee v. State, No. 07 IWCC
0163 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2007) (opinion on review) (affirming arbitrator’s holding
that a defense of insufficient funds is not available to a private employer, so it is not available to
the State); and Zemlyn v. State, No. 06 IWCC 1138 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2006)
(opinion on review) (affirming arbitrator’s holding that insufficient funds available to State does
not justify delay in benefit payment).
181. See supra Part III.B.3.
182. Compare McDonald v. Pinckneyville Corr. Ctr., No. 04 WC 13082 (Ill. Workers’ Comp.
Comm’n 2010) (order), with Kinder v. Choate Mental Health Ctr., 10 IWCC 0828 (Ill. Workers’
Comp. Comm’n. 2010) (opinion on review) (upholding the arbitrator’s determination that
“governmental bodies during times of financial stress are entitled to leniency and broad latitude in
payment of medical bills”).
183. McDonald, No. 04 WC 13082.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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Through no fault of his own, the Commission determined, the employee had
continued to receive collection notices regarding the unpaid bills in question.186
As a result of these factors, the Commission concluded that the State’s failure
to pay the bills in question, despite stipulating to all the facts regarding
compensability, constituted an “unreasonable and vexatious” delay in payment
which justified the imposition of penalties.187 According to the Commission,
the State also failed to assert a “good and just cause as to why it has yet to pay
said bill.”188
Similarly in Studt v. Menard Correctional Center/State of Illinois, while
awarding penalties to the employee in question, the Workers’ Compensation
Commission reemphasized the role which the employer plays in justifying a
delay of compensation.189 Specifically, the Commission noted that “[w]hen a
delay in paying compensation has occurred, the employer bears the burden of
justifying the delay.”190 Whether the employer’s conduct justifies the
imposition of penalties, similarly, should be considered in terms of
reasonableness and is a factual question for the Commission.191 In Studt, the
Commission concluded that the State failed to meet its burden of justifying the
delay of payment, and that its actions constituted “unreasonable and vexatious”
behavior.192
The Commission decision of Taylor v. Vienna Correctional Center also
affirmed an arbitrator’s award of penalties under Sections 19(k) and 19(l)
against the State.193 Most significantly, the Commission’s discussion in Taylor
dealt with the State’s repeated assertion that its lack of funds should excuse
delinquent payment of medical bills and penalties.194 The State contended that
the precedent set by Brown v. State of Illinois, Elgin Mental Health Center was
binding on the Commission and the decision of Brown should be adhered to in
Taylor.195 According to the State, Brown stood for the premise that
“governmental bodies during time of financial stress are entitled to leniency
and broad latitude in payment of medical bills due to financial constraint.”196
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. McDonald, No. 04 WC 13082.
189. Studt v. Menard Corr. Ctr., No. 08 WC 55780 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010)
(order).
190. Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. of Chicago v. Indus. Comm’n, 442 N.E.2d 861, 865 (Ill. 1982);
Smith v. Indus. Comm’n, 525 N.E.2d 81, 85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)).
191. Id. (citing Avon Prods., Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n, 412 N.E.2d 468, 470 (Ill. 1980); Boker
v. Ill. Indus. Comm’n, 489 N.E.2d 913, 918 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)).
192. Id.
193. Taylor v. Vienna Corr. Ctr., No. 10 IWCC 0990 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010)
(opinion on review).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. (quoting Brown v. Elgin Mental Health Ctr., 94 I.I.C. 0892).
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However, the Commission in Taylor found the State’s reading of Brown was
simply dicta and instead recited the holding of Brown as follows:
“[t]he Commission has given broad latitude to governmental bodies when the
delay in payment of compensation is due to financial constraints. However, in
the instant case, [the State] failed to show that financial constraints contributed
to their failure to act in a timely manner with the processing of an above the
197
red line settlement contract.”

The Taylor Commission, in determining the inapplicability of Brown, noted
that Brown did not actually cite any legal authority supporting the proposition
that governmental bodies are due leniency in times of financial duress.198
Rather, the Taylor Commission established, in conformity with Martin v.
Giordano, Section 19(k) penalties apply to all employers regardless of their
formation.199 As a result, the Commission “decline[d] to create a different
standard for imposing penalties and attorneys’ fees for governmental entities
under Sections 19(l) and 16.”200 Therefore, since the Commission had
imposed penalties and attorneys’ fees in numerous similar cases involving
private sector employers, the award of penalties against the State in Taylor was
warranted.201
In October of 2010, the Workers’ Compensation Commission handed
down one of its most recent decisions mandating payment of penalties by the
State in Browning v. State of Illinois, Shawnee Correctional Center.202 In
response to the employee’s petition for penalties, the State cited its “financial
duress,” the prior Commission decision of Brown v. Elgin Mental Health
Center, and a “new” provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act allowing
one percent interest.203 In awarding penalties to the employee under all three
provisions of the Act, the Commission specified simply that it “declines to
relieve [the State] of its obligation to satisfy such an award due to claimed
‘financial duress.’ Many employers, and employees, in this State are under
such duress and yet continue to meet their financial obligations.”204
However, in the face of the recent financial duress the State has been
experiencing, the Commission has been somewhat more reluctant to impose
penalties upon the State in all of the circumstances which, in the past, would

197. Taylor, No. 10 IWCC 0990 (quoting Brown, 94 I.I.C. 0892).
198. Id.
199. Id. (relying on Martin v. Giordano, 450 N.E.2d 933 (1983)).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Browning v. Shawnee Corr. Ctr., No. 05 WC 54547 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n.
2010) (order).
203. Id. The “new” provision of the Act referred to by the State is the remedy given to
medical providers in Section 8.2(d)(3) of the Act. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8.2(d)(3) (2008).
204. Browning, No. 05 WC 54547.
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have been deemed proper to do so by precedent.205 In Kinder v. State of
Illinois/Choate Mental Health Center, the workers’ compensation arbitrator
and Commission denied the imposition of penalties to a similarly situated
employee.206 In his decision, the arbitrator determined that although the
employee’s bills were six months overdue, the employee had been able to
receive additional medical treatment and her credit status had not been affected
by the State’s inability to pay her outstanding bills.207 More importantly, the
arbitrator also addressed the issue of the State’s financial difficulties and
determined that “governmental bodies during times of financial stress are
entitled to leniency and broad latitude in payment of medical bills duet [sic] to
financial constraint.”208 Additionally, the arbitrator and Commission further
determined that instead of imposing penalties on the State as an employer, the
Workers’ Compensation Act provided a remedy to medical providers in the
form of interest payments on the balance owed.209
In two additional, recently-issued, Workers’ Compensation Commission
orders, the Commission again declined to impose penalties against the State for
First, in Dowdy v. Vienna
delinquent payments of medical bills.210
Correctional Center, the Commission stated, “[t]aking judicial notice of the
state’s financial difficulties, the Commission finds that [the State’s] failure to
timely pay said medical bills was not unreasonable or vexatious” and as a
result, the Commission denied the employee’s petition for penalties.211
Similarly, in Mabrey v. State of Illinois Department of Corrections, the
Commission issued an order simply finding “that the State of Illinois [sic] lack
of funding for payment of these bills does not amount to a vexatious or
unreasonable delay in payment.”212
5.

The Need for Consistent Rulings in favor of Penalties

As a result of the aforementioned orders and decisions handed down by the
Commission over the past few years, it appears clear that a consistent ruling on
the issue of whether the State’s financial duress constitutes an exception to the
payment of penalties does not exist. In attempting to reconcile these
determinations, it is difficult to understand why the Commission has chosen to

205. See supra Part III.B.3.
206. Kinder v. Choate Mental Health Ctr., No. 10 IWCC 0828 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n.
2010) (opinion on review).
207. Id.
208. Id. (citing Brown v. Elgin Mental Hosp., 94 I.I.L. 0892).
209. Id.; see also 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8.2(d) (2008).
210. Dowdy v. Vienna Corr. Ctr., No. 08 WC 05672 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010)
(order); Mabrey v. Ill. Dept. of Corrs., No. 07 WC 09331 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010)
(order).
211. Dowdy, No. 08 WC 05672.
212. Mabrey, No. 07 WC 09331.
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award penalties to some employees while excluding others in similarly situated
circumstances. However, one distinguishable characteristic the arbitrator and
Commission seem to implicitly rely on appears in both McDonald and Kinder.
In McDonald, penalties were awarded to an employee,213 whereas in Kinder
the petitioner was denied similar penalties.214 While determining that penalties
were in fact an appropriate remedy in McDonald, the arbitrator noted that the
employee had been receiving collection notices regarding the bills which
remained unpaid by the State.215 In Kinder, by contrast, where penalties were
denied, the arbitrator determined that although the employee’s bills remained
outstanding, the employee’s credit status had not been affected by the State’s
inability to pay for her treatment.216 As a result, external factors, such as the
credit statuses of employees, can guide the rulings of workers’ compensation
arbitrators and commissioners in determining when to apply penalties against a
financially-strapped governmental body.
However, despite the sole distinction seen between Kinder and McDonald,
which may have led the Commission to different results regarding the
imposition of penalties, the factors which govern the remaining Commission
decisions remain unidentified. When the employee’s credit status or ability to
receive medical treatment is not mentioned by the Commission,217 penalties
have been both imposed and denied, with no accompanying rationale
provided.218 As a result, although information regarding an employee’s credit
status or ability to receive medical treatment can be probative and even
indicative of the Commission’s decision when it has been inserted into the
claim, when these factors are absent, the determinations of the Workers’
Compensation Commission have remained overwhelmingly inconsistent and
unpredictable.
In fact, the Act remains silent on the issue of whether an employee’s credit
status and similar external evidence should be considered by the Commission
in determining when to impose penalties. The standard of “unreasonable or
vexatious”219 behavior, the criteria for imposing penalties under Sections 16
and 19(k) of the Act, has been defined by Illinois courts in numerous

213. McDonald v. Pinckneyville Corr. Ctr., No. 04 WC 13082 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n
2010) (order).
214. Kinder v. Choate Mental Health Ctr., No. 10 IWCC 0828 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n
2010) (opinion on review).
215. McDonald, No. 04 WC 13082.
216. Kinder, 10 IWCC 0828 (2010).
217. This statement is meant to indicate the absence of information regarding whether an
employee received collection notices or had been refused further medical treatment and does not
signify whether or not the employee actually encountered such problems.
218. See supra Part III.B.3–4.
219. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/16, 305/19(k) (2008).
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instances.220 However, court-defined characterizations of “unreasonable and
vexatious” have never included delay in payment’s effect upon an employee.
Additionally, while the Commission has discussed and ruled on whether the
State’s financial circumstances constitute “unreasonable and vexatious”
behavior,221 specific factors which accompany the State’s fiscal situation have
not been fully discussed or adjudicated.
Regardless of the individual facts which supplement each claim, e.g.,
whether the employee has been affected financially by the State’s delinquent
payments, the behavior of the State remains the same in each circumstance.222
Essentially, in all of the aforementioned claims and circumstances, the State
has shirked its duty to pay outstanding medical bills in a timely manner,223 and
has additionally avoided the alternative responsibility of penalties.224 As a
result, it seems the State’s failure to pay benefits to its employees due to its
poor financial planning should constitute “unreasonable and vexatious”
behavior, especially considering this behavior may cause its employees. As
the Martin court aptly articulated, “the State of Illinois had a choice.”225 The
Act required that the State either timely pay benefits or give additional
compensation in the form of penalties.226 Since other employers may not “pick
and choose” the compensation they will pay, “[n]either may the State of
Illinois.”227 As a result, since the behavior of the State in failing to pay
medical bills or penalties is equivalent to the conduct of all other employers
who subscribe to the Workers’ Compensation Act, it is appropriate that the
State should also be required to fulfill the same obligations as other employers
who subscribe to the Act and either choose to make timely payments of
medical bills or accept the imposition of penalties.
CONCLUSION
In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., one of the seminal cases in Illinois workers’
compensation law, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the Workers’
Compensation Act, as a piece of legislation, deprives employees of the right to
sue their employers in tort.228 However, since employees give up this common
law right, the Act provides protection to these claimants in the form of “prompt

220. See supra Part I.D.3–4.
221. See supra Part III.B.3–4.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See supra Part III.B.3.
225. Petitioner’s Statement of Exceptions and Supporting Brief at 4, Starkweather v. Menard
Corr. Ctr., No. 08 WC 030919 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2007).
226. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/16, 305/19(k) (2008).
227. Martin v. Giordano, 450 N.E.2d 933, 935 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
228. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 356 (Ill. 1978).
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and equitable compensation for injuries.”229 As a result, due to the exclusive
nature of a workers’ compensation remedy, the importance of providing
employee claimants with a sure award of compensation has been widely
acknowledged by the courts.230 Payment of benefits to an injured employee,
including compensable medical bills, therefore, are rights afforded to an
employee pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act and are an integral part
of an employee’s statutory rights.231 When an employer fails to comply with
its statutory obligations to make such payments, penalties are available to be
assessed against the employer and payable to the employee in reparation for
the employer’s “unreasonable or vexatious” behavior.232
The State, as a governmental body as well as an employer, has been
experiencing a considerable amount of financial duress for the past several
years due to poor budgeting.233 Due to such fiscal problems, the State as an
employer has shirked its duty to provide its employees (and relevant medical
providers) with their appropriate remedies under the Act. The result of the
State’s failure to pay its employees’ compensable medical bills has had a
devastating effect on the State’s employees as well as the judicial
While
determinations of the Workers’ Compensation Commission.234
employees have petitioned for the imposition of penalties against the State in
circumstances where the State has failed to pay the relevant compensable
medical bills, the Commission has handed down numerous inconsistent and
unpredictable decisions regarding when such penalties are enforceable.235 In
fact, most employee claims made against the State for penalties are practically
indistinguishable.236 The one guiding factor provided by the Commission on
the issue of penalties involves the question of whether an employee has
received collection notices or has been unable to receive continued medical
treatment.237 However, when an employee’s credit status has not been made
an issue by either party, the Commission’s decisions still remain ambiguous
and conflicting as to whether penalties should be assessed against the State.
As a result, the Workers’ Compensation Commission has not provided a
clear or reliable precedent on the issue of penalties against the State for delay
resulting from financial duress. However, other private employers have
engaged in similar behavior and were required to either pay its employees’

229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Ocasek v. Krass, 505 N.E.2d 1258, 1259 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
231. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8 (2008) (discussing the payment of an employee’s
compensable medical bills as a statutory right).
232. See id. 305/16, 305/19(k).
233. See supra Part III.A.
234. See supra Parts III.B.2–4.
235. See supra Part III.B.4.
236. See supra Parts III.B.3–4.
237. Supra notes 187–89, 207–10 and accompanying text.
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medical bills in a timely manner or accept the imposition of penalties.238
Likewise, since the State is both a governmental body and an employer, it
seems unjust that it receives preferential treatment and an exemption from the
rules which bind other employers through the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Given that the State, through the legislature, implemented the Act into law, it
seems even more compelling that the State should, through the Commission,
either comply with its provisions or accept the consequence of penalties. By
forcing the State to comply with its own policies, scores of injured workers
who have suffered the financial consequences of the State’s failure to pay their
compensable medical bills would receive much needed, just and equitable
relief.
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